Punt Returner Personalities: The Enterprising Risk-Taker, the Dependable Risk-Averter, and the Consummate-Moderate

Let us examine how the frequency with which punt returners produce negative yardage can be viewed as a sort of personality trait. Moreover, we’ll examine how such a trait can provide insight into on-field performance. The data set (initially) includes 19,363 punt returns from 2002-18 NFL seasons, both regular season and playoffs. We’ll examine the career data of punt returners who spent at least one season as the primary returner for a team. Without snap count data for the whole data set, I defined primary returner as anyone who returned the most punts (plus fair catches) for a team in at least one season; within-season ties for a team were permitted (i.e., could have more than one primary returner from one team in a season). That totaled 227 punt returners, with a range of 8 to 331 career punt returns (only, not fair catches). I then excluded returners with 30 or fewer career returns to have a decent sample size of returns for each returner. This leaves 170 primary returners who, together, returned 16,234 punts and have a median of 79 career returns (25th percentile = 47; 75th = 119). 

The first step was classifying returners based on tendency for negative yards. I started with the proportion of career returns for negative yards based on the findings of the previous post. My criterion for negative return yardage is ≤ -2, excluding returns with muffed catches. I set the threshold at -2 because I felt that returns of -1 yard could occur inadvertently, whereas ≤-2 yards are more likely the result of volitionally moving into the negative. Then I binned returners into three groups using cutoffs at the 33rd and 66th percentiles, or 2.1% and 4.43% of career returns being negative, respectively. I thought this segmentation would provide three groups of risk-preference: risk-averse, moderate, and risk-takers.
Several variables were selected to examine how this conceptualization of risk-preference might relate to on-field performance. For each returner, I computed the following variables to explore relationships between risk-preference and on-field outcomes.

• % of career returns >6 yards 
• % of career returns with a TD
• % of career returns + fair catches that were fair catches
• % of career returns where the returner muffed the catch
• % of career returns where the returner fumbled the ball
• % of career returns where there was an illegal blocking penalty called against a member of the return team

Figure 1. Median career punt returns by risk-preference group

Figure 1 shows that moderate returners have the highest median number of career returns, followed by risk-takers and then risk-averters. One possible explanation is that guys with fewer opportunities to return punts may be more averse to risk, perhaps, in hopes of securing roster spots. There is some potential evidence for this assertion in the data. Returners who were ever a primary returner were less likely to call for a fair catch (32.7%; 7900 of 24129 returns and fair catches) than those who were never a primary (35.3%; 1710 on 4844), χ² = 11.9, p < 0.001. That is, I’m saying that guys who are less experienced returning punts may be more cautious.

Figure 2. For visualization, I split returners into groups above and at or below the median of 53.5% of career returns being >6 yards (2 groups). I split returners into groups above or at and below the median of 1.18% of career returns with a TD (2 groups).

Figure 2 indicates how likely a returner in each risk-preference group is to return for more yards than would be expected by chance alone and return for a TD. Indeed, compared to the risk-averse, moderates (p = 0.02) and risk-takers (p < 0.001) returned a higher proportion of their career punt returns for TDs. Likewise, compared to risk-takers, the risk-averse (p < 0.001) and moderates (p = 0.04) returned a higher proportion of their career returns for >6 yards. If we exclude negative returns and returns for TDs and look at the % of returns >6 yards, the difference between risk-averters (57.9%) and risk-takers (54.7%) is significant (p = 0.01); but moderates (54.8%) are no different than risk takers (p = 0.43).

Figure 3 shows probabilities and standard errors of other variables by risk-preference. Moderates (p < 0.001) and the risk-averse (p < 0.001) had a higher proportion of fair catches than the risk-takers. This suggests that risk-takers were less likely to call for a fair catch, but this is largely my own conjecture as we cannot account for whether returners had more punts out of bounds, downed, declared dead, or touchbacks. Also, we cannot account for how often returners returned a punt when they should have called for a fair catch. 

Figure 3. Proportion of career punt returns are fair catches, muffed, fumbled, or had a holding-type penalty, by group.

Compared to the risk-takers, the risk-averse had significantly fewer returns with penalties (p = 0.005), and there was a similar trend for the moderates (p = 0.12). This finding is potentially due to some quality of risk-takers because the results are essentially unchanged if we control for number of career returns, career average return yards, and career touchdown return %. Likewise, using all of the data, penalties are called less often on negative returns (9.9%; 7 of 720) than positive returns (12.3%; 2292 of 18643), χ² = 3.83, p = 0.05 (penalties enforced and declined are included).

There were no significant group differences in the proportion of fumbles (ps > 0.24) and muffs (ps > 0.32). If we control for the number of career returns, average yards, and TD%, the risk-averse tend to have fewer fumbles than the moderates (p = 0.13) but otherwise, the proportions of fumbles and muffs are unchanged. 

There is a shortcoming of my thesis to consider. I am assuming that returners who are more often tackled for a loss of ≤-2 yards (i.e., negative returns) on returns are also more likely to run into the negative area overall. Based on the available data we cannot determine if this is the case. It may be that the risk-averse and moderates run into the negative just as often, but the risk-takers just are more likely to be tackled after running into negative return yardage space. A caveat to this is that risk-taking returners tended to be less likely to call for fair catches. However, only if we have data indicating that the risk-takers are more likely to forgo fair catches when the coverage unit is closing in on them can it be demonstrated that they are more likely to take risks.

Importantly, these findings show that there appears to be a balance to productive punt returning: Risk-takers may produce more TDs, but they also produce return yardage less consistently, whereas risk-averters may produce return yardage more dependably, they also produce fewer TDs. Ultimately, punt returners who take risks in moderation are probably the most productive in that they consistently produce decent return yardage while still producing TDs at a relatively high rate.


Methods 
We used generalized linear models (GLMs), specifying Poisson distributions, to compare on-field outcomes between the risk-preference groups. There were six GLMs. The dependent variable was the quantity of career returns with a given outcome, for each returner. The independent variable was risk-preference. The DV was offset by the total career punt returns (or punt returns + fair catches for the model of fair catches, this yields a proportional value. The variables are described below.

• The proportion of career returns >6 yards. I used >6 yards because 7 is the median of 90% of the punt returns in the data (range of -1 to 32) and it is a decent guess at the return yards we would expect to occur randomly. Then I split returners into groups above and at or below the median of 53.5% of career returns were >6 yards (2 groups). In other words, returners with a lower proportion of returns >6 yards are more often returning punts below what we would expect based on chance alone.
• The proportion of career returns with a TD. I split returners into groups above or at and below the median of 1.18% of career returns with a TD (2 groups). My thought was that risk takers should return TDs at a comparable rate as the other groups, despite having more negative returns.
• The proportion of career fair catches, which is the number of fair catches divided by the sum of fair catches and returns. Ideally, the number of fair catches would be divided by the number of punts on which the returner was on the field to return the punt. Nevertheless, the thought here is, risk-takers should be less likely to call for a fair catch overall. 
• The proportion of career punt returns where the returner muffed the catch. I included this as a measure of conscientiousness. That is, can the returner do the most critical and fundamental part of successful punt returning: catch the ball?
• The proportion of career punt returns where the returner fumbled the ball on the return. I included this as another measure of conscientiousness, perhaps, although fumbles tend to be random events. 
• The proportion of career punt returns where there was a block in the back or illegal block called against a member of the return team. 

Returning Punts and Losing Field Position

Fans of collegiate and professional football teams have seen it. The opposing team punts. Arrival of the coverage unit is imminent as your return man situates to catch the ball. He shows nary a handwave, telling everyone there will be no fair catch on this punt. No, yours is an enterprising returner. Upon catching the punt, he will begin to explore the prospect of negative return yardage whilst attempting to evade the coverage unit. Perhaps, he will pick up some punctual blocks from his teammates or move quickly enough to elude would-be tacklers before reaching open grass and improving field position for your offense. Sometimes this risk produces minimal gains and on other occasions, the returns are huge. Yet, to the displeasure of fans and the hypertension of coaches, sometimes many yards are lost, and offenses start drives closer to their own endzone. 

There are other ways that field position is lost. I’m less interested in these, but we can examine them too. Punt returners can muff the catch or fumble the ball during the return. Although neither muffs nor fumbles guarantee lost field position, both create a risk for lost field position. Moreover, both risk turnovers--let alone the detriment to field position. Penalties. Specifically, the holding, block in the back, and clipping varieties, which can negate returns and start the offense closer to their own endzone. 

Who is to blame for lost return yardage? The ability of the return team to pressure the punter and the extent to which the coverage unit protects the punter. The skill of the punter to both focus and execute as well as the distance (and hangtime) of the punt matter, too. It is the punt returner who chooses to run toward his own endzone. It’s also on him if he muffs the catch, and he needs to protect the pigskin to prevent fumbles. Penalties just suck, I'm sorry. Nonetheless, regardless of how it occurs, lost field position is created by an interaction between individual players and their emergent units. One simple way we can look at who is responsible for lost field position on punt returns is intraclass correlations (ICCs; though my methods differ).

Our data are (primarily) 19,363 punts that were returned during 2002-18 NFL seasons (regular and some playoffs; holding-type penalties included). We include in the model return teams and coverage units both by season and across seasons to account for seasonal personnel changes and season-to-season consistency, respectively. Season itself was included to account for League-wide fluctuations in gameplay. In each model, we shall also account for the line of scrimmage and the punt yards. 

Table 1. ICCs of Team Units for ways Field Position is Lost on Punt Returns in NFL, 2002-18

	On Punt Returns				All Punts
Unit	Negative Yards	Muffs	Fumbles	Penalties	Penalties
Returner	0.059	0.042	0.028	0	NA
Return Team by Season	0.001	0.014	0	0	0
Punt Team by Season	0.021	0.025	0	0.001	0.004
Punter	0.012	0.008	0	0	0
Return Team in all Seasons	0	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.001
Punt Team in all Seasons	0	0.005	0.008	0	0
Season	0.005	0.019	0	0.006	0.007
Unit R² (sum of ICCs)	0.098	0.114	0.042	0.009	0.012
Line of Scrimmage & Punt Yards R²	0.043	0.092	0.004	0.019	0.073
Total R²	0.141	0.206	0.046	0.028	0.085

Across all seasons, 721 non-muffed punts were returned for negative yardage, or 3.72% of returns, with an average of -3.53 yards (SD = 2.25). Table 1 contains ICCs for each unit. The ICC value means that 5.94% of negative yardage is due to some qualities of punt returners, 2.11% is due to some qualities of the punting teams, and 1.23% is due to the punter. In other words, the ICCs can be summed to obtain an approximate R². The effect of punting team is not statistically significant (p = 0.32) but the effect of punter tends to be (p = 0.07), and the effect of returner is (p < 0.001) (compared to models with each excluded). Together, the remaining factors account for 0.54 %. That only 9.82% of the responsibility for negative returns is meaningfully explained speaks to the stochastic nature of punt returns and special teams in general. 

Unsurprisingly, returners bare the most responsibility for muffs. However, the punting team and the return team appear to contribute to this meaningfully as well. Returners appear to be mostly responsible for fumbles. Penalties appear to be mostly random based on the ICCs all being < 1%. 

Summarily, the present report showed that punt returners carry the most responsibility for negative return yardage, but qualities of the punting team and punter are likely involved. Conceivably then, some punt returners should be more likely than others to have returns for negative yardage. In other words, a subset of returners may attempt to evade tacklers despite the risk of compromising field position for their offensive units. How such a tendency relates to punt return outcomes (e.g., yards gained or touchdowns) is a matter for future study. 



Methods
For analysis we’ll use generalized linear mixed models and specify binomial distribution. Essentially, we are estimating the likelihood that there is a return of negative yards, a muff, a fumble, or a penalty on a given punt and how much of that can be attributed to returners, punter, return teams, coverage units, and the season. Return teams and coverage units were examined by season and overall to account for seasonal personnel changes and season-to-season consistency, respectively. Season was included to account for League-wide trends in gameplay. We also include the punt spot and punt yards. For each GLMM, we'll use the icc() function of sjstats package in R to compute ICCs.

Bulleted below are definitions for each of the ways field position is lost by punt returners and units. 

• I define negative returns as returns of ≤ -2 yards on an attempted return without a muff. Muffing should be should be considered separately from a decision to run into negative yardage. I set the threshold at -2 because I felt that returns of -1 yard could occur inadvertently, whereas ≤-2 yards are more likely the result of volitionally moving into the negative.
• Muffs occur when the returner botches the catch. Muffs do not necessarily result in lost yardage, but they risk lost yardage and turnovers.
• Fumbles occur when the returner loses possession of the ball during the return. Same caveats as muffs.
• Penalties are holding, block in the back, and clipping penalties committed by the return team. We’ll look at penalties with and without considering returners, that is, on punt returns only (i.e., 19363 punts) and then on all punts (i.e., 41912 punts). This is because the play-by-play data only tell me when a returner was on the field for punt returns and fair catches and so we exclude returner from the model with all punts.